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Again, I’ll remind everyone that much of the material in this article appears in the Gamers’ Guide to 1900, which can be found in the variants section of the Diplomacy Pouch under 1900. I recommend that those of you familiar with the Gamers’ Guide to 1900 proceed to the end of this article. There you will learn how France has performed in 1900 games to date. I hope you find this interesting. -- Baron I'll start this article off by saying that some Franco-philes think I've placed France in a hopeless situation. When compared to Diplomacy's strong and relatively secure Third Republic, 1900’s France is unquestionably in a more compromising position. This is because I intentionally worked some things to France's disadvantage. I don't believe for a second, however, that I've reduced France to "meat" as one player claimed I did. Instead, I contend I simply leveled the playing field. Yes, I do think the current playing field needs leveling. Though Russia has more solos, France is the strongest Great Power in Diplomacy in my opinion. Statistics appear to back me up.
These numbers clearly demonstrate that France is a force to be reckoned with. Why is this so? To begin with, France has unopposed access at game-start to two neutral supply centers (SCs), Portugal and Spain. Unless things go seriously wrong, France should get two builds in '01. A third build for grabbing Belgium is not out of the question. Next, France is an excellent ally for both England and Germany. Odds are in France's favor that either an E/F or an F/G will form early in the game. Either alliance will normally ensure France continues to grow in a slow, but steady manner as the game progresses. France's corner position is also a big advantage. While France's corner is not quite as secure as the corners inhabited by the two Wicked Witches, it still makes France better off defensively than Germany or Italy. With no enemy at its back, France can focus all of its energy on pushing units north and east. A hostile Italy is sure to make things more difficult for France, but Italy's extremely limited growth potential, its position in the center of the board, and its isolation from potential anti-French allies all combine to give France the edge. So what could be done to bring France back to the pack? I decided on four courses of action that I'll discuss in turn:
As mentioned earlier, both Portugal and Spain usually go to France in '01 in Diplomacy. This gives France at least 5 units heading into '02 and a relatively secure corner position. A quick look at the 1900 map shows that Portugal and Spain are still there for the taking. Additionally, to the south, we see that France begins the game in possession of a new SC, Algeria, in northern Africa. To guard its African outpost, France is given a third army, A Algeria (representing the vaunted Armee di Afrique). It so happens that A Algeria has access to two new neutral SCs, Morocco to the west and Tripolitania to the east. That's 4 neutral SCs within easy reach of French units and we haven't even mentioned two others yet, Belgium and Switzerland. So far, so good. The bad news is that Britain, France's traditional nemesis, is a major player in the southwest corner of the map. As mentioned in the previous article on Britain, a new space, Gibraltar, forms a juncture between Spain, the Western Mediterranean, Morocco, and the Mid-Atlantic Ocean. Sitting squarely in the middle of the Gibraltar space, and therefore squarely in the middle of France's potential empire, is a shiny new British fleet. Needless to say, Britain's F Gibraltar can wreak all kinds of havoc on French plans for expansion. If Britain is friendly, the President may as well accept the fact that the Prime Minister is going to use F Gibraltar to grab a nearby SC as Britain's "fair share." If Britain is hostile, the Prime Minister can use F Gibraltar to contest French attempts to seize Morocco, Portugal, or Spain. The actions of F Gibraltar and French commitments elsewhere may mean France will struggle to get even one neutral SC. Even worse, F Gibraltar can support the movement of Britain's F Egypt into the Mid-Atlantic Ocean. Such a move is sure to ruin the President's day. Consider the following:
Obviously, the disposition of F Gibraltar is likely to be a lively topic in any talks between London and Paris. Of course, getting this "small" matter resolved may seem like a walk in the park compared to the issue of access to the Mid-Atlantic Ocean. I can't imagine any President ever feeling truly comfortable while a British fleet is cruising around in the Mid-Atlantic Ocean. The chance that a British dreadnought might suddenly sail into a French-controlled territory is simply too high to ignore. As a result, French units that could be used on the eastern front against Germany and/or Italy may end up pulling garrison duty. Conversely, the Prime Minister isn't likely to shout for joy at the prospects of a French fleet patrolling the Mid-Atlantic Ocean. Not only would this cut Britain off from its Mediterranean holdings, it might actually threaten the security of Egypt or Britain itself. While it is certainly possible for Britain and France to reach an accord on how to handle traffic in the Mid-Atlantic Ocean, the potential for friction between the two Great Powers is likely to remain high. Having to contend with the greedy moneylenders of perfidious Albion is bad enough, but the President's concerns don't end there. To the southeast lies Italy. Unlike the weak Italy found in Diplomacy, the Italy in 1900 is more than capable of making the President's life unpleasant. Unfortunately for France, a number of map-related changes potentially increase the chance of conflict with Italy occurring. For starters, France and Italy must wrestle with the issue of Switzerland, a new neutral SC. This is an extremely ticklish matter for France and Italy since Switzerland touches home SCs in each Great Power. Noting that France has access to several neutral SCs while Italy does not, the Pope will almost certainly claim that Switzerland should go to Italy and will often move to take it in '00. Given that the northern Italian army is now in a new Italian SC, Milan, instead of Venetia (formerly Venice), the Pope can send troops to Switzerland right away. Even more alarming for France, the elimination of Tuscany means that A Rome can be moved directly to Piedmont. An Italian opening of A Milan to Switzerland and A Rome to Piedmont may give Italy Switzerland and threaten Marseilles at the same time. France has several tactical options available that should prevent Marseilles from falling to an Italian attack in '00. The next year, however, matters may become more problematic. France’s access to the Mediterranean is limited to Marseilles or the path through Gibraltar. Regarding the former, it is not difficult for Italy to keep Marseilles bottled-up so French fleets cannot be built there. As to the latter, moving French fleets from Brest through Gibraltar is slow and generally requires British cooperation. Without reinforcement, France’s African holdings are extremely vulnerable. Italy, on the other hand, can easily position units against French targets in the Mediterranean. If Italy enjoys any growth at all, Italian units may soon overwhelm French defenses, both in southern France and in Africa. Ugh! Before discussing Germany, I want to briefly mention Austria-Hungary. Making Switzerland passable technically establishes the Dual Monarchy as a French neighbor. While it’s true that for centuries France and Imperial Austria were bitter rivals for influence over the many minor German and Italian states that stood between them, this rivalry largely came to an end after 1859 with the establishment of an independent Italian kingdom. In 1900, the dynamics are such that the Dual Monarchy is unlikely to get involved directly in French affairs early on. While an Austro-Hungarian thrust westward at game-start (almost certainly in alliance with Russia) cannot be discounted, it’s something the President is unlikely to lose sleep over. No, if the President does get nightmares when he thinks about his eastern frontier, it will be due to the large shadow cast by Germany. The Reich in Diplomacy is something for Paris to be concerned about. The Reich in 1900, on the other hand, is something to be feared. With little difficulty at all, Germany can capture Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands in ‘00. Those three builds represent a lot of sturmtruppen. Even more frightening from a French perspective is the fact that Germany can often grab those three neutrals without using A Munich. This leaves A Munich free to meddle in Swiss affairs or, even more ominous, advance towards France by moving into Alsace. Needless to say, the President may notice that the room seems to have gotten a lot hotter when ’01 starts and he sees German armies in Alsace, Munich, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Cologne pressing against the French border. If the Kaiser is set upon France’s destruction, he may risk getting his three builds in ’00 for the chance of putting a dagger in France’s heart. A Cologne to Belgium and A Munich to Alsace in the Spring followed by A Alsace to Burgundy supported by A Belgium might just do that. Even if Germany is friendly, the President may feel like someone who keeps a pet tiger in his house: if the tiger ever turns on you, things could get ugly. My goodness! This is all bad news! With British, Italian, and German (oh my!) units buzzing all around him, what’s a President to do? Well, as bleak as the picture I’ve painted above appears, I should point out that the situation France faces in 1900 is actually far better than the one that France had to deal with in the years following the Franco-Prussian War. Crushed and humiliated by Prussia, France was in a truly vulnerable position. First, to the east, it had to face a new, powerful, and menacing German Empire sitting squarely in France's former playground. Germany's army had already shown itself to be superior to France's army and no amount of French elan was going to close the gap (although the French earnestly began believing that it would). Second, Britain, France's rival for two centuries, ruled the seas and was leaving France behind in the race for colonies. French weakness vis-à-vis Britain was exposed to all of Europe during the Fashoda Crisis of 1898. Third, the newly formed Kingdom of Italy was casting covetous eyes on French possessions in North Africa. The two nations nearly went to war when France occupied Tunisia in 1881. Fourth, France was completely estranged from both Austria-Hungary and Russia, each of which distrusted French republicanism. Finally, France’s once dominant position of influence in the Porte had dwindled significantly. By 1914, France’s fortunes had changed dramatically. France counted both Britain and Russia as solid allies and it had effectively separated Italy from its partners in the Triple Alliance. This stunning turnaround was a credit to French diplomacy (although one could argue that France might not have achieved these successes had German diplomacy been handled more competently). According to D.J. Goodspeed in The German Wars: 1914-1945, “The historian is almost tempted to conclude that between 1890 and 1914 France possessed the only really skillful diplomats in Europe.” In 1900, the Frenchman is going to have to work just as hard as his historical counterparts did to ensure the Third Republic does not stand alone in a hostile world. Fortunately, France does have a number of advantages that can be exploited. To begin with, I must reemphasize the fact that 6 neutral SCs can be reached by French units in ’00. Only Britain, with access to 8 neutral SCs in ’00, can boast more neutral SCs within its sphere of influence. While it’s true that Britain, Germany, and Italy can contest French access to these SCs, 6 SCs still represent considerable potential for growth. Next, France makes a great ally for any Great Power that feels threatened by Germany. Since Germany effectively borders every nation except Turkey, France may have lots of suitors expressing concern about the 7 SC Germany that is likely to appear in ‘01. Turkey should not feel left out, however. France also happens to be an excellent ally for any country wanting to keep mighty Britain in check. Since Russia, as much as France, is likely to be keeping a watchful eye on all of those blue and black blocks on the map, it wouldn't be surprising to see Republican France and Tsarist Russia come to terms, much as they actually did when they formed the Entente. Need makes for strange bedfellows indeed! The irrefutable key to French survival, however, is to ensure the Third Republic is not the odd man out in the B/F/G triangle. This is entirely a diplomatic matter and failure is almost sure to mean a quick exit from the game. Relations with Italy are just as critical. Far more so than in conventional Diplomacy, the Pope is likely to openly side with whichever Great Power, Britain or Germany, is opposed to France. Presidents need to either convince Popes that it is not in Italy’s interest to attack France or be prepared for a potentially arduous war on France’s southern flank. Selling the Pope on an alliance with France or, at least, benign neutrality may be a difficult task, but it’s not an impossible one. Almost certainly it will involve giving Italy a free hand (or even support) in Switzerland and Tripolitania in ’00. Also, there is a significant element of risk involved since Italy can easily stab an unprepared France. However, the freedom of action Italian friendship or neutrality gives France may be worth the effort. Needless to say, if the President finds himself fighting Britain, Germany, and Italy in ’00, his diplomacy has been a complete bust. Any President in this situation should find a quiet place and start writing his memoirs while he waits for his appointment with Le guillotine. In looking at France’s options in Spring ’00, it’s clear the President is going to have to take risk somewhere. He simply doesn’t have enough units to cover every contingency. Given this, it’s important that he have a good feel for how successful his diplomacy has been. Let’s examine several different scenarios for Spring ‘00: Scenario 1: France is allied with Britain against Germany, and Italy is neutral or friendly. Given this situation, the President should consider A Paris to Picardy, F Brest to Gascony, A Marseilles to Burgundy, and A Algeria to Morocco. These moves bring France’s two armies to bear against Germany, start moving F Brest to the north coast of Spain where it is unlikely to offend either Britain or Italy, and provide a small measure of insurance against British or Italian treachery. When combined with Britain ordering F Gibraltar to Mid-Atlantic Ocean, F London to North Sea, and F Edinburgh to Norwegian Sea, B/F is in excellent position to take four neutral SCs in the Fall (Norway and Portugal to Britain, Morocco and Spain to France). Also, B/F has three units on Belgium, a development that puts all kinds of pressure on the Reich. Scenario 2: France is allied with Britain against Germany, and Italy is hostile. The primary danger in Scenario 1 is that Italy will take advantage of France’s trust to grab Marseilles. The resulting builds from the acquisition of 3 SCs (Switzerland, Tripolitania, and Marseilles) combined with the lack on an effective B/F presence in the Mediterranean would put Italy in tremendous position to dominate the area. Certainly, the Kaiser is going to point this fact out to the Pope. Few Popes could be blamed for succumbing to the temptation (weak creatures of flesh that they are). Because of this, the President may decide to take some precautions or, like a true Frenchman, go on the offensive.
In executing the moves above, the President would like to see Britain order F Gibraltar to Spain(ec) and F Egypt to Cyrenaica. If Marseilles is not in danger of falling to an Italian attack, Britain can order F Spain(ec)-Gulf of Lyon to really put the heat on Italy and F Cyrenaica to Tripolitania. If Marseilles is threatened, Britain can have F Spain(ec) support France in or into Marseilles while France’s A Southern Algeria takes Tripolitania. There are problems with these moves though. First, while they put considerable pressure on Italy, the President won’t be able to ignore the fact that the bulk of the German army is poised to spill into northern France. The sooner the British can land the BEF on the continent, the better. Second, and just as frightening from the President’s point of view, Britain comes out rather well in the bargain. With British units next to many French SCs, the President may crack under the strain of waiting for the seemingly inevitable British stab. Scenario 3: France is allied with Germany against Britain, and Italy is neutral or friendly. Any game-start war with Britain forces the President to determine whether or not F Egypt will be moved to the Mid-Atlantic and, if it is moved, whether F Gibraltar will be used to support the movement. If the President believes F Egypt to Mid-Atlantic Ocean is likely and F Gibraltar will support the move, then it’s probably best for him to order F Brest to English Channel in the Spring. This will ensure Brest does not face a 2:1 attack in the Fall. If the President thinks he’ll catch an unsupported British fleet moving to the Mid-Atlantic Ocean, he should order F Brest to Mid-Atlantic Ocean. If he does this, however, it is probably best to position A Paris where it can support F Brest in the Fall in the event the President guessed wrong. Regardless of what is done with F Brest and A Paris, the President should order A Marseilles to Spain and A Algeria to Morocco. Taken together, these orders give France its best chance of maximizing its own builds in the Winter while minimizing British builds. Given British options in this scenario, the Great Power that emerges on top initially, Britain or France, is likely to be the one whose leader guesses best. Fortunately, France only needs to hold on. The pressure of Germany’s High Seas Fleet on the Royal Navy should eventually allow France to seize and hold the initiative. Scenario 4: France is allied with Germany against Britain, and Italy is hostile. This does not represent a pleasant situation for France since the odds are that any coordinated B/I activity will be directed squarely at the Third Republic. In particular, France’s African Empire will probably be lost and Iberia/southern France put under intense pressure. France’s moves under this scenario are similar to those discussed under Scenario 3. Significantly, A Paris should move to Burgundy to protect Marseilles from an Italian attack. The key to success, however, may be to get the Kaiser to open with A Munich to Switzerland. If the Kaiser does this, Marseilles is safe in ’00 since the Italian can have at most one unit, A Piedmont, facing it. The question then becomes whether Franco-German forces can work their way down Italy’s boot faster than Anglo-Italian forces can push through Africa, Iberia, and southern France. If the Third Republic is lucky, B/I will not be as effective as it could be due to friction over the division of spoils. In many ways, France’s lot in 1900 is comparable to that of Austria-Hungary in conventional Diplomacy. Both are surrounded by potential foes and can be attacked from all sides at once. Both enjoy inherent strengths, but are unlikely to survive long if unable to develop a strong relationship with a trustworthy ally. Both are likely to be viewed as the junior partner in any alliance for the first few game years. However, just as a 7 or 8 SC Dual Monarchy can be a handful in Diplomacy, a 7 or 8 SC Third Republic in 1900 is a force to be reckoned with. The challenge for the President will be to get his Great Power through those dangerous early years. In summary, the key differences between France in Diplomacy and in 1900 are as follows:
The bottom line to all of this is that France is more vulnerable in 1900 than it is in Diplomacy. Given France’s record of superior performance, as discussed earlier in this article, increasing its vulnerability should enhance overall play balance between the Great Powers. Ironically, the fearsome reputation France has established in Diplomacy may be the single greatest handicap the President has to overcome. Rumors of France’s demise in the 1900 variant should not be exaggerated though. When Presidents exercise solid diplomacy and use sound tactics the Third Republic has not only thrived, it has prospered. France’s performance in 1900 games played to date bears this out. As I’ve done in each of the previous articles, I’ll caution readers against drawing any firm conclusions one way or the other regarding France’s performance. The sample size, while growing larger, is still too small to determine with any degree of confidence that France is better off or worse off in 1900 than in Diplomacy or that 1900’s play balance is better or worse than Diplomacy’s play balance. The sample of 1900 games can be summarized as follows:
OVERALL RECORD:In the twenty-one games that have been completed, France has two solos, four draws (two 3-ways, one 4-way, and a 5-way), four survivals, and eleven eliminations. This gives it a Great Power Rating (GPR) of 26.71 and ties it for third place overall with Italy. [NOTE: As discussed in the first article, an average Great Power has a GPR of 25.71.] It’s worth noting that France’s GPR in 1900 is far below its GPR in Diplomacy (29.69) and much closer to average. Since this was exactly the result I was hoping for, I’m optimistic that the fixes put in to decrease French power have worked. There are those, however, who believe that what I’ve really accomplished is the transformation of France to a weakling comparable to Diplomacy’s Austria-Hungary. They site the high number of eliminations as an area of concern and they may have a point. France was eliminated in 52% of the completed 1900 games. This is a much higher elimination rate than France has in Diplomacy. For example, in two hundred Diplomacy games played on AOL from 1998-2001, France was eliminated sixty-five times (roughly 33%). Curiously, at this time, France and Italy have exactly the same record in terms of solos, draws, survivals, and eliminations. Even more interesting, in twenty-one games, they were both eliminated or they both were around at game-end a mere four times. In the remaining seventeen games, one was eliminated while the other at least survived. Not once have both been included in the same draw. This would suggest that success for one Power comes primarily at the expense of the other and that France and Italy are truly mortal enemies. I’d like to believe that this is not that case and that France and Italy can form an alliance that benefits both of them over the long run. So far, however, F/I cooperation has been virtually non-existent. My hope is that this will change over time as Presidents and Popes explore their options, but I really have no reason for optimism at this point. COMPETITIVE SIZE:Let’s quickly recap what this statistic measures. I believe that once a Great Power attains a certain “threshold size,” its ultimate success or failure becomes primarily a function of how well it is played and is not due to any liabilities or advantages conferred upon it by its starting position. Given this belief, I measure how often a particular Great Power reaches “competitive size” during the course of a particular game. In the case of Great Powers that start the game with 3 SCs, I felt that 7 SCs represented the appropriate competitive threshold, while 8 SCs represented the competitive threshold for Great Powers starting the game with 4 SCs. Further, if any Great Power reached 13+ SCs, it was considered “large.” Being “large” meant that the Great Power had a reasonable chance of winning or participating in a draw. In the games that have been completed, the “average” Great Power reached competitive size 54% of the time and became large 20% of the time. France reached competitive size in 48% of the games completed to date and it got large in 24% of those completed games. It appears this particular statistic is of some importance to France. This is because France is one of only two Great Powers, Austria-Hungary being the other, that was eliminated in each completed game in which it failed to reach competitive size and that survived (or better) in each completed game in which it attained the magic 8 SC threshold. France’s record suggests that by the time it reaches 8+ SCs, it has largely overcome the difficulties inherent in its starting position and can exploit the advantages that have traditionally made France so fearsome in Diplomacy. BUILDS IN '00:Here, I attempt to measure how quickly and consistently a particular Great Power “gets out of the blocks.” In the thirty-five games that have progressed to Fall ‘00, France has been held without any builds in ’00 five times (and actually lost ground in two of those games), has gotten one build in ’00 ten times, two builds in ’00 ten times, and three builds in ’00 ten times. I should point out that in several of the games in which France got one or two builds in ’00, it actually lost a home SC, either Brest to Britain or Marseilles to Italy. This certainly represents an auspicious start for France and provides some justification for those who argue that 1900’s Third Republic is a mere shell of what it should be. Still, the fact that France has started out quickly (i.e., two or more builds in ’00) in 57% of its games cannot be ignored. While a fast start is no guarantee of success, it seems evident that France does have decent prospects at game-start and claims the Third Republic is little more than a punching bag for its neighbors might be a bit overstated. NEUTRALS:In Diplomacy, France regularly claims both Portugal and Spain. Belgium is also a distinct possibility, though England and Germany are rivals for that particular neutral. 1900 sees a dramatic change in the division of neutral spoils between France and its neighbors. While there are now six neutrals within easy march of French units at game-start, the competition is much fiercer. Britain is a very real threat in Iberia and North Africa. Germany is predominant in the Low Countries. Italy has its eyes on Tripolitania. Neutral Switzerland is arguably the hottest of cauldrons, as France vies with Germany, Italy, and even Austria-Hungary for influence. Thus, while there are more neutrals for France to try for, its odds of capturing any one neutral are not so high that the President can take anything for granted. To date, France’s record of acquiring certain neutrals first is as indicated below:
OPENING MOVES:The opening moves for thirty-five games have been recorded (unfortunately, the records for the very first 1900 game were lost). In looking at France’s opening moves, there are some things worth noting.
Finally, I’m more than a little surprised that A Algeria-Tunisia is used so frequently (34%). This is because A Algeria-Southern Algeria is a far superior move. As discussed earlier, an army in Southern Algeria not only allows France to accomplish everything that an army in Tunisia could accomplish (i.e., influence events in Tripolitania, defend Algeria), an army in Southern Algeria can also move to Morocco if the British prove to be unfriendly. I expect that, over time, the move to Tunisia will be used less frequently and the move to Southern Algeria will become more common. That’s it for now. In the next article, we’ll look at Germany. Until then, Happy Stabbing!
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B.M. Powell ([email protected]) If you wish to e-mail feedback on this article to the author, click on the letter above. |
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